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1. Introduction 
According to the seminal models of tax competition (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; 
Wilson, 1991; Bucovetsky, 1991), capital mobility leads governments to strategically 
decrease their capital tax in order to prevent their country from suffering large capital 
outflows. Empirical research has generally been supportive of this proposition, both when 
analysing the sensitivity of firms’ location choices to fiscal policy, as well as fiscal 
interactions between governments. For example, comparing the results of 25 empirical studies 
on the sensitivity of foreign direct investment to corporate taxation, De Mooij and Ederveen 
(2003) estimate the median value of the tax base elasticity to be -3.3. Moreover, tax rates 
across countries exhibit significant positive spatial dependence, suggesting the presence of 
strategic interactions among governments (e.g., Devereux et al., 2008; Overesch and Rincke, 
2009; Cassette and Paty, 2008; Redoano, 2014). 
More recently, models using a New Economic Geography (NEG) framework show 
that the intensity of tax competition depends in fine on the level of trade integration, through 
its impact on the sensitivity of capital flows to fiscal policies. More precisely, the relationship 
between corporate taxation and trade integration is non-monotonous (Ludema and Wooton, 
2000; Andersson and Forslid, 2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ottaviano and Van 
Ypersele, 2005). Unfortunately, almost all empirical studies on international tax competition 
implicitly refer to the standard tax competition literature, according to which firms are 
perfectly competitive and there are no frictions to trade (Devereux et al., 2008; Cassette and 
Paty, 2008). An exception is the empirical study by Davies and Voget (2011) on corporate tax 
interactions in the European Union. Building on a stylised model of tax competition between 
three countries, they show that firm location strategy is driven by the relative level of after-tax 
market potential. Therefore, assuming that governments seek to maximise corporate tax 
revenues, the tax level in one country is more sensitive to that of countries where firms enjoy 
a higher market potential. Davies and Voget (2011) provide empirical evidence for this 
finding and show that governments respond more to taxes set in EU countries as compared to 
non-EU countries, suggesting that European enlargement might exacerbate tax competition. 
However, none of these studies investigate the specific – and ambiguous – impact of trade 
integration on taxes. A first contribution this paper makes to the literature is to translate the 
NEG framework into an empirical model that allows us to determine how trade integration 
affects tax competition. This is important as it provides the tools to evaluate, for example, 
whether further trade integration among OECD countries would exacerbate or dampen tax 
competition. 
Our second contribution likewise follows from the use of NEG models of tax 
competition. Unlike most previous empirical papers – which define links between countries in 
an ad hoc manner (for an exception, see Davies and Voget, 2011) – we set up a model of tax 
competition characterized by imperfect trade integration, increasing returns to scale and 
asymmetric market sizes, from which we explicitly derive the tax reaction function. In such a 
framework, the existence of agglomeration economies carries two implications regarding the 
slope and the constant of the tax reaction function: tax interactions are stronger for the less 
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populated country, and the constant of the reaction function is increasing with the number of 
firms that a country would attract in a world without public policies. Indeed, the tax base 
elasticity is lower in the bigger country that benefits from a higher market potential, so that 
the government can tax agglomeration economies. Our empirical approach then consists of 
estimating this tax reaction function with a panel covering (up to) 26 OECD countries over 
the period 1982 to 2006. Specifically, we test (a) whether tax interdependencies are linked to 
the relative size of countries and the level of trade integration (by using a theoretically 
grounded index of bilateral trade integration), and (b) whether market potential positively 
affects corporate tax rates. Note that the latter tests whether further trade liberalization, by 
improving the market potential of countries, allows governments to raise taxes (through the 
constant of the reaction function), whereas the former tests whether it contributes to the 
decline of corporate taxes by fostering tax interactions (through the slope of the reaction 
function). 
The paper proceeds as follows. We start in section 2 with a brief description of the 
model and present the tax reaction function that will be tested. The empirical specification is 
described in section 3. Our results and robustness checks are described in section 4. The 
results broadly support the theoretical prediction regarding the constant of the tax reaction 
function. The real market potential exerts a positive and very significant impact on effective 
average tax rate or statutory tax rates. The empirical evidence regarding the slope of the 
reaction function depends on the weighting schemes. We provide clear evidence that national 
governments significantly react to a cut in corporate taxation in the most populated countries 
of the sample. The empirical evidence regarding the influence of trade integration on tax 
interactions is less clear-cut. Our findings reveal that bilateral trade integration gives rise to 
significant interactions with respect to effective average tax rates when we consider a 
subsample of European countries. Therefore, in the case of European countries, we provide 
empirical evidence for the ambiguous impact of trade integration on corporate taxes in 
European countries. On the one hand, the decline in trade costs strengthens tax interactions 
and contributes to a race-to-the-bottom in corporate taxes. On the other hand, trade integration 
improves the real market potential of countries and thus allows government to set a higher 
corporate tax irrespective of the tax policy in the other countries. Importantly, we further 
investigate the mechanism driving tax interactions by allowing the coefficient on tax 
interactions to vary depending on the degree of capital mobility in countries. Our findings 
reveal that when using relative population weights, a country adjusts its tax rate to the average 
level in the other countries only if those countries are characterized by an equal or higher 
degree of capital mobility. In the case of trade integration weights, the evidence shows that 
strategic interactions only prevail between countries that are characterized by a high degree of 
capital mobility. This suggests that the willingness to attract firms (or to avoid their relocation 
abroad) might well be a relevant explanation for the existence of interdependencies in 
corporate taxes at the international level. The final section concludes. 
2. Theoretical background 
We consider economic geography models with mobile physical capital and immobile labour, 
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which are the most relevant when it comes to international tax competition given the low 
mobility of labour across countries. In particular, we use the model of Ottaviano and Van 
Ypersele (2005), which we simplify, without loss of generality, by assuming oligopolistic 
rather than monopolistic competition. 
The economy consists of two large countries   1,2 of possibly different sizes but 
identical technology. There are two factors of production, physical capital and labour, whose 
total endowments are denoted by K and L, respectively. Total factor endowments are equally 
distributed across individuals. However, we assume that a share  of the total population 
lives in country i, with  	 1/2. While these workers are immobile, they can invest their 
capital wherever they want. 
The private sector consists of a modern industry and a traditional one. Each industrial 
firm produces a homogeneous product under increasing returns to scale and Cournot 
competition. By contrast, firms in the traditional sector produce a numéraire good under 
constant returns to scale, using labour as the only input. The public sector in each country is 
represented by a benevolent government, which imposes a lump-sum tax  on capital 
invested in its country. If this tax is positive, the resulting tax revenues Ti are redistributed in a 
lump-sum way to the workers, while if a government subsidizes capital these expenditures are 
financed through lump-sum taxation of workers. 
2.1.   Consumption 
Consumers in both countries share the same quasi-linear utility function:  
    β2  																																																								1 
where  denotes the individual consumption of the industrial good and  the consumption of 
the numéraire.  
Every resident in the economy supplies one unit of labour and / units of capital. The 
wage rate in each country is determined in the numéraire industry, which uses labour as the 
only input. Free trade in the numéraire thus equalizes the wage across countries as . 
Moreover, each resident receives income from capital at the world net return to capital, 
denoted by . Thus, the budget constraint for a representative consumer in country i is given 
by:  
   
     																																															2 
where pi denotes the price of good x in country i. 
Given (1) and (2), the individual demand for the manufactured good in country i is given 
by      ⁄  so that the total demand for this good in each country is:  
      																																																																			3 
2.2.   Firms 
Firms in the manufacturing sector produce a homogeneous good under increasing returns to 
scale and Cournot competition. The production of the manufactured good requires a fixed 
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amount of one capital unit and each unit of output requires one unit of labour. Moreover, good 
 is traded at a cost of ! units of the numéraire per unit shipped between the two countries, 
which raises the marginal cost of serving the foreign market to   !.1 
Firms are able to segment their markets by choosing the quantities to sell on the domestic 
and the foreign market independently. Therefore, the total gross profit of each firm in country 
i is given by:  
Π      #$   !%$    (4) 
where $ denotes sales in country j. Maximizing profits taking into account demand yields 
the following output levels for a firm located in a country i:  
  β
    !&$  1 ;					$ 
1  β
    !#&$  1%  1  
where &$ stands for the share of capital invested in country j. Intuitively, everything else 
equal, an exporter sells less in a market than an indigenous rival ($ ( ) because of trade 
costs, and we focus on the cases where the trade cost is low enough to ensure that $ and $ 
are positive. 
The resulting equilibrium price in country i is the following:  
    !&$    1 . 
Observe that the consumer price level increases with trade barriers because the local firms are 
more protected against foreign competition, but decreases with the number of firms located in 
this country because of a competition effect that is declining as trade costs fall.  
Inserting these equilibrium prices in (4) yields the following operating profits in the 
short-run:  
Π∗   +
    !&$  1 ,

 1   +
    !#&$  1%  1 ,

 
In the long-run, net profits are equal to zero in equilibrium due to free entry and exit. Thus, 
the equilibrium rental rate is determined by a bidding process for capital, which ends when no 
firm can earn a strictly positive profit at the equilibrium market price, that is: 
  Π∗  . 
The location equilibrium of capital can now be found by solving the arbitrage condition 
according to which no unit of capital can induce a higher net return by being invested in 
another country, that is, when Π∗    Π$∗  $  . The resulting share of capital invested 
in a country i is given by:  
																																														&  12  - 
1
2.
2  2  !
!/0000000100000002
345
   12! β/0102
6
#  $%																						5 
where 2  2  ! 	 0 under the trade condition.  
      We first analyse the term &9, which stands for the share of mobile firms located in a 
country when governments do not rely on their public policies to attract them. There are two 
                                                 
1
  The term ‘trade costs’ must be understood in a general sense, as including non-tariff barriers and transportation 
costs. 
 6 
main mechanisms driving the location of firms: one agglomeration force due to the advantage 
of being near demand which is increasing with trade integration (:&9 : 	 0⁄  and :&9 ::! ( 0⁄ ) (a reminiscent of the ‘market potential effect’), and one dispersion force 
due to the proximity of competitors (‘market crowding effect’). When trade is costly and 
countries have different sizes, the market potential effect does more than compensate the 
market crowding effect so that the country with a larger demand for the increasing-returns 
industry attracts an even larger share of the production. 
Now let us analyse how tax policies affect the location of firms. When capital is taxed 
according to the source principle, a unilateral increase in country i’s tax rate or a decrease in 
the other country’s tax rate generates a capital outflow from country i  (:&9 :  ; ( 0⁄ ): 
this is the so-called tax base erosion effect.  
Interestingly, the two components of eq. (5) encapsulate the opposite effects that trade 
integration might exert on the attractiveness of countries, and thus on the government’s 
behaviour. On the one hand, as trade costs decrease, the location of capital becomes relatively 
more responsive to the tax policies than it is to the market forces (; increases) so that more 
capital is attracted to the low-tax country. On the other hand, as trade gets freer, everything 
else being equal, it becomes more profitable to serve the small market through export. Trade 
integration thus improves the attractiveness of the largest country thanks to agglomeration 
economies, and this will allow its government to raise taxes without suffering from a large 
capital outflow. Importantly, there is a trade cost threshold under which it becomes so cheap 
to serve the foreign market through exports that a core-periphery structure emerges, 
characterized by the complete concentration of manufacturing firms in the biggest country 
where the tax base elasticity is equal to zero. In what follows, we ignore the latter possibility 
because we test predictions of the model on a dataset in which even the less industrialized 
countries attract manufacturing firms.2 
2.3. Tax competition 
We assume that each government is benevolent. Inserting the budget constraint in the national 
welfare function, we get the following objective function for government of country i:  
<  =&  &  &  !>?@A?A 
where =     2⁄  denotes the consumer’s surplus,   & stands for the tax 
revenues redistributed to residents if  	 0 (or the total taxes paid by them if  ( 0), and &
 
is the income from capital ownership.  
In the extreme case where all firms are clustered in a country, the tax base elasticity is 
equal to zero and the complete agglomeration of firms creates rents that can be taxed away by 
the government without inducing capital outflow.3 As pointed out by Hünerbein and Seidel 
                                                 
2
 Even though this is an imperfect indicator, note that in our sample the share of industry in the GDP is always 
higher than 20%. More importantly, the ‘new’ EU member states – which are often considered as peripheral 
countries (at least during the time period considered in our empirical study) – succeed in attracting FDI from 
western countries, for example in the car industry. Therefore, our dataset does not include the kind of core-
periphery pattern predicted by New Economic Geography models.  
3
 Therefore, there are no tax interactions. The tax outcome is such that the tax differential between both countries 
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(2010), the downward trend in corporate taxes casts doubt on the existence of such a taxable 
agglomeration ‘rent’. The explanation provided in their model is that intra-regional tax 
competition within core countries could make it impossible to tax the agglomeration rent. 
Here, we analyze another possibility. We consider that agglomeration economies are not 
strong enough to give rise to a core-periphery pattern. This implies that governments consider 
that the tax base elasticity is always negative, and that it varies across countries depending on 
their relative attractiveness. 
Considering such a scenario of partial agglomeration, the maximisation of the 
objective function with respect to it  gives the following first-order condition:  
:<:  
:=:&
:&:/001002
BCDEFGHI	EFIJKFE	HLLHBM	N
 &   :&:/00010002
MOP	IHQHDFH	HLLHBM	R/N
 σ ::/0102
BOJMOK	DBCGH	HLLHBM	R/N
 0 
Clearly, the consumer’s surplus effect is negative: governments have an incentive to cut 
capital taxes in order to attract firms so that competition becomes fiercer in the country and 
the price level falls, making consumers better off. The two other effects are ambiguous. The 
tax revenue effect provides governments with an incentive to increase capital taxation 
provided that the tax base elasticity is lower than one in absolute value. Following a tax rise, 
the capital income effect also goes in two opposite directions: the induced outflow of capital 
reduces competition on the goods market and thus raises the gross return to capital, whereas, 
for a given amount of capital, a tax rise has a direct negative effect on the net return to capital.  
Interestingly, each of these incentives to tax can be expressed as a function of the level 
of taxes in each country and the amount of capital invested in the country at the free-market 
equilibrium. Indeed, we can rewrite the first-order condition as follows:  
:<:  Φ U  Ψ U $  Σ U &9  Ω  0 
where Φ, Ψ, Σ	and Ω are positive bundles of parameters. Thus, the tax reaction function of 
a country i boils down to: 
  ΨΦ U $ 
ΣΦ &9 
ΩΦ 																																																												6 
with 
ΨΦ 
2  1  2  14  1  2  1 ΣΦ 
1
;
2  2  4  1  2  1 ΩΦ 
1
;
    ! !⁄4  1  2  1 
In the following, we will concentrate on the two first terms of the above expression, that is: 
the slope of the reaction function (first term) and the constant of the reaction function that 
depends on the structural attractiveness of the country (second term).4 By doing so, we can 
                                                                                                                                                        
is equal to the difference in gross return to capital evaluated at the core-periphery location equilibrium (see 
Ottaviano and Van Ypersele, 2005). 
4
 The last component of equation (6) encapsulates the welfare loss from a marginal rise in taxation that depends 
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analyse how the structural attractiveness of one country influences the fiscal policy of its 
government. 
        The slope of the reaction function is always positive and lower than 1. We also observe 
that the government of the most populated country is less responsive to the tax policy of the 
other country since its tax base elasticity is lower than that of the less populated country. The 
second term of the reaction function indicates that everything else being equal and provided 
that trade costs are positive, the capital tax is increasing with the share of firms a country 
would attract thanks to market forces only. Indeed, the agglomeration of capital in a country 
reduces the tax base elasticity, and by doing so allows the government to raise its capital tax. 
This effect is also reflected in the expression of Nash taxes given by the intersection of the 
two best reply functions:5 
∗  4  2  ;4  5 &9  Ξ																																																	7 
with  
Ξ  21  σ  2  2  1    2]    ! !⁄ ^_1  σ  2  1  1`2;4  5  1  
Before confronting the above tax reaction function and the reduced form of Nash taxes 
to the data, it is of interest to point out that their properties are robust to numerous extensions. 
These results are qualitatively similar in a model where mobile firms produce horizontally 
differentiated goods (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005), where capital owners live in a third 
country (Haufler and Wooton, 2010), or under alternative hypotheses regarding the behaviour 
of governments (for example, when they provide a public good, when they are Leviathan or 
when the government of the most populated country acts as a Stackelberg leader6). 
 
3. Empirical specification 
We consider that when deciding upon its tax policy, each national government i adjusts its tax 
rate M to the average tax rate of the other countries N̅,M instead of reacting to the tax rate of 
each country separately. This approach is standard in the literature, and allows us to solve the 
problem of the degrees of freedom that we would otherwise have. Given the linearity of the 
reaction function (6), one should thus test the following regression:  
    N,M  bN̅,M  cdeM  fghij  kM     (8) 
The cdeM variable stands for the real market potential aimed at approximating the term &9 
of the tax reaction function (see discussion in section 3.2), hij denotes a vector of control 
variables which will be discussed in section 3.2, and kM is an i.i.d. error term. The average tax 
rate of the other countries is defined as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                        
neither on the level of taxes nor on the location of firms. In what follows, we disregard this term since its 
analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
5
 Ξ  is a bundle of parameters which captures the influence of the spatial distribution of capital ownership on 
corporate taxation. Analysing this relationship would go beyond the aim of the paper, so we disregard this term. 
6
 We refer the reader to Gaigné and Riou (2007) for results under the assumption when governments are 
Leviathan. The results obtained when the government of the most populated country acts as a Stackelberg leader 
or when governments provide a public good are available from the author on request. 
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N̅,M  ∑ m$M$M$n   
with m$M the weights of a matrix normalized such that	∑ m$M  1$n . The estimated 
regression written in matrix form is thus:  
  b<  cde  f  k 
where < denotes the weight matrix. The estimated coefficient bo gives the average 
responsiveness of country i’s fiscal policy to all other countries of the sample, while the 
responsiveness of country i’s corporate tax rate to country j ’s tax rate is given by bom$M.7 
This regression will be tested on a database that covers (up to) 26 OECD countries for 
the period from 1982 to 2006.8 These countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States of America.9 Data 
definitions, summary statistics, and sources are given in Table 1 of appendix A.2.  
3.1.   Weighting schemes 
Unlike many existing empirical studies on international tax interactions, we use weight 
matrices inferred from the model. The model shows that a country responds more fiercely to 
its trading partner when the latter is more populated. Thus, we build a weight matrix based on 
the ratio of population in each competing country j over population in country i:  
m$MJCJ  #epe$M epeM⁄ % q #epe$M epeM⁄ %$nr  
with epeM the population in country i .10 Thus, the higher the population of country j 
compared to country i, the higher the tax base elasticity in country i, and we expect its 
government to respond strongly to a tax cut in country j. 
 Although we would expect trade costs to attenuate interactions through their negative 
impact on the tax base elasticity, they cancel out in the slope of reaction function. However, 
with more sophisticated models we can show that the decline in trade costs strengthens tax 
interactions. This is true, for example, if we include infra-national trade costs, asymmetric 
trade costs across countries, or if we assume an endogenous labour supply so that the wage 
becomes dependent on the level of trade integration (see Exbrayat et al., 2012). Thus, we also 
                                                 
7
 Thus, even if we consider that each country adjusts its tax policy to the average tax rate of the other countries, 
it reacts more or less strongly to each one of them as far as we define non-uniform weight matrices.  
8
 The starting point follows from the availability of corporate tax rate data (source: Loretz, 2008), while the 
endpoint is due to the lack of market potential data after 2006 (source: CEPII Market Potential Database). The 
final dataset is unbalanced since the data regarding some new EU member states is only available in the second 
part of the time period. As a robustness check (see section 4.2), we provide results using a smaller but balanced 
sample. 
9
 We included all countries in the tax dataset by Loretz (2008), except Republic of Korea and Mexico for which 
there are many missing values for taxes or bilateral trade, as well as Belgium and Luxembourg for which the 
CEPII does not provide data on bilateral trade and market potential. 
10
 Note that because of the row standardization, this is equivalent to using a weighting scheme based on the 
absolute population of each neighbouring country. However, this is not a problem. By expressing weights as a 
function of relative (rather than absolute) population, we can easily check that the derivative of msA> with respect 
to the relative population (epesA epeA⁄ ) is positive. 
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build a weight matrix based on a measure of bilateral trade integration etu$M defined by 
Head and Mayer (2004) (namely, the index of ‘trade phi-ness’). Inferred from a new 
economic geography model (the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model), this index is described by the 
square root of the ratio of trade flows between two countries over trade flows within each 
country (see appendix A.1).11 We believe that this would better capture the ‘border effects’ in 
explaining why countries are not as well integrated as one could expect if we focused 
exclusively on legal barriers to trade (McCallum, 1995; Wei, 1996). Moreover, this measure 
is bilateral and thus allows us to specify a more accurate weighting scheme than if we relied a 
standard trade openness variable.  The resulting weight matrix is defined as follows: 
m$MJv  etu$M q etu$M$nr  
This approach complements the contribution by Davies and Voget (2011). They take into 
account the joint influence of trade integration and the market size of countries by testing 
whether each country responds more fiercely to the tax policy of neighbouring countries when 
the latter enjoy a higher market potential. By contrast, we aim at assessing the specific impact 
of trade liberalization on tax interactions. 
We will compare the results of these two weighting matrices with other weighting 
schemes traditionally used in the literature, and that are aimed at approximating economic 
integration. The first matrix is based on FDI flows to capture the impact of capital mobility on 
tax interactions, and is defined as follows:12  
m$MLw  xyu$M q xyu$M$nr  
with xyu$M the sum of inward and outward FDI flows over the GDP in country j. A high and 
significant coefficient associated with this weighting matrix would mean that a government is 
more sensitive to the tax policy of other countries when those countries generate or host 
important FDI flows. The second weighting matrix approximates economic integration by the 
inverse of distance and uses the following weights:  
m$wEM  #1 yu=$⁄ % q #1 yu=$⁄ %$nr  
where yu=$ stands for the geodesic distance between country i and j.13  
Existing empirical studies also typically introduce a uniform matrix such that the 
corporate tax rate of each country is equally weighted. A well-known problem with this 
uniform matrix is that we cannot distinguish tax interactions caused by tax competition from a 
common period-specific shock (see Devereux et al., 2008). Hence, we do not use this uniform 
matrix, and we ensure that the same problem does not occur with the matrices we use by 
checking there is enough dispersion in the weights.  
                                                 
11
 See Niepman and Felbermayr (2010) for another empirical study using the ‘trade phi-ness’ index to 
approximate trade liberalization. 
12
 This measure is also used in empirical papers that estimate the impact of capital mobility on corporate tax rates 
(Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008). 
13
 We use the CEPII database on bilateral distances. Geodesic distances are calculated following the great circle 
formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of 
population). 
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3.2.   Other variables 
We first comment on the measure of corporate taxation. We concentrate on ex ante measures 
that take into account the fiscal legislation (statutory tax rate, depreciation allowances, etc.) in 
order to evaluate the impact of taxes on the expected profits of a typical investment.14 While 
the statutory tax rate is the most direct measure of the tax rate, effective tax rates are 
theoretical measures combining information on both the tax rate and the tax base in order to 
estimate the effective fiscal burden on a typical investment. Specifically, the effective average 
tax rate (EATR) is aimed at evaluating the impact of taxes on location choices made by 
profitable firms, whereas the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) matters for marginal 
investment choices made by firms conditional on their previous location choice (Devereux 
and Griffith, 1998). Since our theoretical framework considers an environment of lumpy 
investment, we choose as a benchmark case tax interactions in the setting of effective average 
tax rates, under the assumption that they are levied on machinery because this is a mobile and 
tradable good (unlike buildings). As robustness checks (see section 4.2), we then compare the 
results using effective marginal tax rates or statutory tax rates as dependent variables. 
To approximate the attractiveness of a country resulting from market forces (&9), we 
use a market potential variable. Indeed, empirical studies confirm that the domestic market 
size and the accessibility to foreign markets are the main determinants of firms’ location 
choices (Benassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Head and Mayer, 2004b) 
whereas the fiscal policy has a marginal impact on the location of firms. Specifically, we rely 
on the real market potential variable provided by the CEPII, which has several advantages.15 
First, it is estimated from a theory-grounded gravity equation, so that the endogeneity bias of 
such a variable is controlled for (see Head and Mayer, 2011). Secondly, it takes into account 
that the market potential in a country is not only increasing with demand coming from other 
countries but also decreasing with the average price in those countries, and thereby captures 
the market-crowding effect at work in the model. Thirdly, it is estimated using a dataset 
covering more than 150 countries, and thus allows us to indirectly take account of third-
country effects. 
Finally, let us discuss the choice of control variables that compose the vector hij. 
While these variables do not matter for the location of capital, they influence the 
government’s tax policy through other channels. The size of the public sector is approximated 
by a variable for public consumption. Following Davies and Voget (2011), we limit the 
potential endogeneity bias of the public sector size in two ways: by expressing public 
consumption expenditures as the share over GDP and by taking the lagged value of this 
                                                 
14
 By contrast, ex post measures of corporate taxation are defined as a ratio of tax revenues over the tax base. 
Thus, they are backward-looking measures that cannot capture the impact of taxes on the behaviour of firms. 
15
 For more information on the CEPII dataset, see http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/marketpotentials.htm. 
This dataset provides estimates of real market potential until 2003. In order to extend the data to 2006, we 
replicated what Head and Mayer (2011) call the “RV04” method. This consists in estimating a gravity-type 
regression à la Redding and Venables (2004), with a larger vector of trade impediments including not only 
distance and contiguity, but also common language, colonial links, and dummies for common membership of a 
regional trade agreement, a currency union or GATT/ WTO membership. 
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variable (ezp{=,MN).16 We expect this variable to have a positive impact on the corporate 
tax rate as it calls for more fiscal revenues to finance public goods. We also introduce the 
highest domestic income tax (u{zM), which we expect to exert a positive impact on the 
corporate tax rate. Indeed, the tax gap between personal and corporate income taxes could 
induce individuals to escape tax on their earnings by incorporating themselves. As a 
consequence, the corporate tax rate could act as a backstop for the income tax (Slemrod, 
2004). Various socio-demographic variables are used in order to control for the effect of the 
structure of population on the fiscal policy: the share of young people (|p}M), the share of 
old people (pyM) and the share of people living in urban areas (}c~M). We also control for 
the impact of the business cycle on the fiscal policy with GDP growth from year A  1 to year 
A (yecM). We expect economic growth to result in lower corporate taxation. Indeed, a 
positive productivity shock favours capital inflow. Thus, governments could lower their tax 
rates during economic upturns to have a balanced budget (Bretschger and Hettich, 2002). An 
EU membership dummy }M (equal to 1 if the country is a member of the EU and 0 
otherwise) is also introduced to capture the specific behaviour of European countries. Finally, 
we follow Devereux et al. (2008) by allowing for the political persuasion of the governing 
party. We include a dummy variable indicating whether the party of government is to the right 
of centre (cutM), and we interact right-wing and left-wing dummies with the majority in 
parliament (dcutM and dxM variables) to account for the possibility that parties 
only have a decisive influence on tax rates if their majority is strong enough.   
3.3.   Econometric issues 
We have to deal with three main problems to estimate the tax reaction function (8): 
endogeneity, serial correlation and heterogeneity.  
 
Endogeneity. Strategic interactions in the setting of corporate tax rates imply that they are 
simultaneously determined. Hence, the average corporate tax rate of other countries ̅M is 
correlated with the residuals. To deal with this endogeneity, we have to find variables that are 
correlated with neighbours’ endogenous average tax rate (N̅,M), while not being correlated 
with kM. As is common in the literature, we rely on the weighted average of neighbours’ 
control variables as instruments. That is, in a first step we regress < on a subset of < and 
we use the predicted values <  as instruments for	<.17 This identification strategy rests on 
the assumption that the neighbours’ control variables are correlated with their average 
                                                 
16
 We thought of several instrumental variables to test for the potential endogeneity of public consumption 
expenditures. The literature usually relies on total population, economic openness or political variables as 
potential instruments for government size. These variables are not good instruments, however, as they are likely 
to exert an influence on corporate taxes. That is the reason why we treat this variable as exogenous and limit the 
endogeneity bias by taking its lagged value. As a further robustness check, we run regressions without the public 
consumption expenditures variable. This does not have any impact on our main results, which are either 
unchanged or even slightly more significant (available from the author on request). 
17
 We limit the number of instruments because using too many instruments leads to inaccurate estimation of the 
optimal weight matrix, biased standard errors and, therefore, incorrect inference in over-identification tests (see 
Roodman, 2008). 
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corporate tax, but are exogenous to the setting of the corporate tax in country i. We test the 
validity of the instruments by the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The joint null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. We also report the 
result of the Klebergen-Paap underidentification test to ensure that the equation is identified, 
i.e., that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. The top 
income tax rate can also be endogenous since a government could decide simultaneously upon 
its corporate and income tax rates. We thus test for the endogeneity of this variable.  
 
Serial correlation. There is a strong inertia in the evolution of corporate tax rates over time. 
We include a lagged dependent variable in order to deal with the resulting serial correlation 
bias. As is well known, this lagged dependent variable is correlated with the fixed effects, and 
thus treating it as exogenous may lead to biased estimates (Nickell, 1981). Since the Nickel-
bias is decreasing with T, we follow Devereux et al. (2007) by selecting the fixed effects 
estimator and instrumenting the lagged dependant variable by its second lag.18  
 
Heterogeneity. We account for non-observable characteristics varying over time or space by 
introducing country fixed effects  and a time trend	M. Indeed, adding time dummies would 
be formally equivalent to including the average tax of all countries. Being highly correlated 
with the weighted average of tax rates in other countries, such a variable makes it hard to 
disentangle the impact of time dummies from tax interactions. We therefore follow Klemm 
and Van Parys (2012) by using a linear time trend. 
To summarize, we estimate the following spatial and temporal auto-regression:  
M  ,MN  bN̅,M  cdeM  fgM    M  kM 
and we present the results of both the static model (  0) and the dynamic one (  0).  
 
4. Results 
In a first step, we estimate the baseline regression on the sample of 26 OECD countries, using 
the effective average tax rate as the dependent variable. Next, we undertake various 
robustness checks.  
4.1.   Baseline results 
The results of our baseline regression are described in Table 2. The two first columns report 
results without tax interactions, whereas columns [3] to [6] present the estimates when both a 
spatial and a time-lagged variable are introduced. 
We first analyse the determinants of corporate taxes at the Nash equilibrium by 
                                                 
18
 Alternative treatments of the Nickell bias are unfortunately unsatisfactory. The GMM estimator is not adapted 
to our sample. The set of instruments is too large, which overfits the endogenous variable and distorts the test of 
over-identifying restrictions (see Roodman, 2008; Bowsher, 2002). Restricting the set of instruments then yields 
another problem: the instability of results. More generally, as Beck and Katz (2004) argue, the motivating case 
for the development of these dynamic panel models was the case of very short panels with very small Ts. This 
alternative solution is therefore not adapted to our sample. 
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describing the results of the static regression in column [1]. We present standard errors 
clustered by country, which are robust to serial correlation. Our findings are supportive of the 
model’s prediction (see eq. (7)). We find a significantly positive effect of the real market 
potential on effective average tax rates. In terms of control variables, we treat the top income 
tax rate as exogenous because the Hausman test rejects the hypothesis of endogeneity of this 
variable. Consistent with Devereux et al. (2008), the coefficient of this variable is 
significantly positive. This suggests that the corporation tax is used as a “backstop” to income 
tax. Countries with a high share of young people tend to set lower effective average tax rates. 
In addition, the coefficient on EU membership is significantly negative. This suggests that 
European integration exerts a downward pressure on corporate taxation. However, those 
results might well be due to an omitted variable bias, because we do not control either for the 
influenced of the lagged dependant variable, nor for the impact of the other countries’ tax 
rates. We address each of these issues in turn. 
When choosing the current tax rate, national governments can be heavily restricted by 
the existing tax system. Ignoring this effect is likely to exert an upward bias on all coefficients 
estimated by the static regression. Therefore, in column [2] we add a lagged dependent 
variable and instrumental it by its second lag. The equation both passes the serial correlation 
test and the test of overidentifying restrictions. As expected, the lagged dependent variable is 
strongly significant, with a coefficient equal to 0.753. This confirms that there is a high 
persistence of effective average tax rates over time. Intuitively, controlling for this effect 
could challenge the significance of the other explanatory variables. Overesche and Rincke 
(2011) already demonstrated that, once the dependence of tax rates over time and tax 
competition is controlled for, country characteristics such as population size do not contribute 
much to explaining corporate tax rates in European countries. We may wonder whether this 
conclusion also holds regarding the impact of the market potential on corporate tax rates. The 
few existing empirical studies do not answer this question, since they do not include a lagged 
dependent variable (Charlot and Paty, 2007; Davies and Voget, 2011). Our findings reveal 
that the coefficient on real market potential variable becomes lower but remains significant at 
the 5% level. Regarding the remaining control variables, the addition of the lagged dependent 
variable reduces the coefficient on EU membership and makes it insignificant. In contrast, a 
rise in public consumption relative to GDP significantly reduces the effective average tax rate. 
This could result from the fact that this variable includes both productive and non-productive 
expenditures, which we expect to exert an opposite impact on countries’ relative 
attractiveness. As soon as non-productive expenditures become predominant, a rise in public 
expenditures can induce a capital outflow and lead governments to cut corporate taxation to 
limit this capital outflow.19 Note also that left-wing parties that benefit from a significant 
majority tend to set higher tax rates. 
                                                 
19
 This interpretation is also in line with the findings of Benassy-Quéré et al. (2007). Using a dataset of FDI 
flowing from the United States to 18 European countries in the period 1994–2002, their estimates reveal that 
funding a marginal increase in public capital through corporate taxation induces capital outflow, because public 
capital is not productive enough to compensate for the required increase in corporate taxation. Klemm and van 
Parys (2012) also point out that government consumption expenditures have a negative impact on FDI in Latin 
American, Caribbean and African countries for the period 1985–2004. 
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In columns [3] to [6], we introduce the possibility of tax interactions by adding the 
weighted average of the effective average tax rates of the other countries. Each column 
corresponds to one of the four sets of weights described in section 3.1. Column [3] represents 
the relative population weights directly inferred from the theoretical framework. Columns [4] 
[5] and [6] rely on weights based on the phi-ness trade index, the inverse of distance and the 
ratio of FDI over GDP, respectively. For each column, the average tax rate is instrumented by 
the weighted average of a subset of control variables and we report the results of two tests 
regarding those instruments. The Hansen test of over-identifying restriction does not reject the 
validity of the instrument set. The regression also passes the Kleibergen-Paap 
underidentification test, indicating that the model is identified. In each column, most control 
variables remain significant. Importantly, the coefficient on real market potential is still 
positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level, with a coefficient varying between 0.16 and 
0.25. This provides support for the theoretical prediction in eq. (6) that the structural 
attractiveness of a country allows its government to set a higher level of corporate taxation 
whatever the tax policy choices in the other countries.  
The evidence regarding tax interactions is more equivocal. The results indicate that the 
slope of the reaction is significant and positive when the weighting matrix is based on the 
relative population. Specifically, we find a coefficient of 0.502 significant at 5% level.20 This 
finding is in line with results of Cassette and Paty (2008) and supports the theoretical 
prediction of the economic geography framework detailed in section 2.21 
In contrast, none of the three other weighting schemes yields significant tax 
interactions. This leads us to consider several explanations. The presence of outliers, in terms 
of distance (USA, Canada, Japan, Australia) or population (USA), could bias the estimates of 
the slope of reaction functions. Most of the existing studies that provide empirical evidence on 
tax interactions consider European countries (Cassette and Paty, 2008; Overesch and Rincke, 
2011; Redoano, 2014),22 whereas we focus on OECD countries. The specificity of this sample 
could explain why the empirical evidence on strategic interactions is limited to the relative 
population weighting scheme. In addition, our sample is unbalanced. Therefore, the variation 
in the weights is partially caused by changes in the number of countries from year to year. 
Finally, governments might behave strategically with respect to statutory tax rates rather than 
effective average tax rates. In the following section, we provide several robustness checks in 
                                                 
20
 Recall that our theoretical model is a static one. We run a dynamic regression to check whether or not strategic 
tax interactions remain significant once we control for the inertia of corporate taxes over time. Our aim is not to 
quantify the long-run effect of tax competition. To do so, one has to test a regression allowing dynamic 
adjustment to shocks, period-specific and country-specific effects. We refer the readers to Overesch and Rincke 
(2011) for such an empirical study. They conclude that in the absence of tax competition, the mean statutory tax 
rate of Western European countries in 2006 would have been about 12.5 percentage points above its actual level. 
21
 Most empirical studies on tax interactions rely on relative GDP rather than relative population weighting 
schemes in order to test whether tax interactions are increasing with the size of countries. They also find 
significant tax interactions using this weighting scheme. To some extent our result also points in the same 
direction, although using a weighting scheme which carries fewer suspicions of endogeneity. 
22
 An exception is the contribution of Devereux et al. (2008), who consider 21 OECD countries over the period 
1981–1999. Our results are not directly comparable as we have only the FDI weighting scheme in common and 
our sample is larger. Using this weighting scheme, they find significant interactions in the setting of statutory tax 
rates, but the test of over-identifying restrictions rejects the validity of the instrument set. 
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order to address these issues. 
4.2.   Robustness checks 
First, we estimate our baseline on two alternative samples. Then, we estimate the baseline 
regression using alternative tax measures. Finally, we further investigate the driving force 
behind tax interactions. 
 
(a) Alternative  samples 
 
As a first step, Table 3 provides results on the largest balanced sample. This sample 
includes 18 countries over the period 1982–2006.23 One notices first that the R² tends to be 
slightly higher for all specifications. Hence, the fact that the number of countries varies over 
time seems to limit the ability of the econometric model to explain the determinants of 
effective average tax rates. Moreover, this is not without consequences for the slope of the tax 
reaction function. Using a balanced sample, we provide some evidence of significant tax 
interactions in the case of both FDI and relative population weights. In the case of relative 
population weights, the coefficient is still significant at the 5% level, but there is some 
evidence of serial correlation. Importantly, when taxes of the other countries are weighted by 
their share of FDI over GDP (column [6]), the coefficient of tax interactions becomes 
significant at the 10% level with a value equal to 0.277. Finally, we verify that whatever the 
weighting scheme, the empirical evidence regarding the positive influence of the real market 
potential on effective average tax rates is very robust, with a coefficient significant at the 1% 
level. 
Next, we estimate the regressions on European countries exclusively. The aim is to 
figure out whether the existence of outliers in terms of distance could influence the empirical 
evidence regarding the pattern of tax interactions. To define European countries, we rely on 
the United Nations categorization of geographical regions of the world. We are left with a 
sample of 20 countries.24 Results are reported in Table 4. As one can see from columns [3] to 
[5], the coefficient on the slope of the tax reaction is significant at the 10% level when 
countries’ tax rates are weighted by their relative population, their bilateral level of trade 
integration or the inverse of distance. The coefficient varies from 0.246 (with distance 
weights) to 0.488 (relative population weights). Those results are consistent with the existing 
empirical studies on tax competition in Europe (Cassette and Paty, 2008; Redoano, 2014). In 
line with Cassette and Paty (2008), who estimate tax interactions in the European Union over 
the period 1995–2005 through a dynamic model, we do not find support for the existence of 
tax interactions with respect to countries with a high ratio of FDI over GDP.25  
                                                 
23
 These countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United States. 
24
 France, Switzerland, Portugal, Ireland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Italy, Greece, Great Britain, 
Germany, Finland, France, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Hungary, Slovak republic, and Sweden. 
25
 Once they consider the possibility that Western and Eastern states would respond differently depending on the 
group of countries they interact with, Cassette and Paty (2008) show that tax interactions using the FDI 
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Unlike existing studies on tax competition in Europe, we also provide evidence that 
bilateral trade integration gives rise to significant interactions in the setting of effective 
average tax rates. In the meantime, the real market potential is again significant at the 1% 
level whatever the weighting scheme, with a coefficient slightly higher than for the two other 
samples. Interestingly, this means that trade integration in Europe exerts two opposite 
pressures on the effective average tax rate. On the one hand, the decline in trade costs 
strengthens tax interactions and contributes to the fall in corporate taxation. On the other 
hand, everything else being equal, it raises the real market potential and allows governments 
to set a higher tax rate. 
Finally, the political orientation of the government significantly influences tax choices 
in European countries. Higher effective average tax rates are associated with both right-wing 
parties and left-wing parties which have a significant majority.26 
 
b) Alternative tax measures 
 
We now provide the results of the baseline regression by using alternative measures of 
corporate taxation. Recall that the effective average tax rate is the relevant indicator of the tax 
burden on profitable projects that generate economic rents, while the effective marginal tax 
rate approximates the tax burden attributable to a marginal non-profitable investment. 
Moreover, the NEG literature suggests that governments compete for discrete investments. 
Thus, we can expect the above theoretical predictions to be more relevant for investigating the 
determinants of effective average tax rates than those of effective marginal tax rates. We also 
test for tax interactions in the setting of the statutory tax rate because: (i) it could be easier for 
governments to manipulate statutory tax rates than to change the definition of the tax base, (ii) 
the comparison of statutory tax rates between countries is easier for firms than the comparison 
of effective tax rates, and (iii) governments could compete over statutory tax rates to attract 
profits made by multinationals which adopt tax optimisation behaviour (Devereux et al., 
2008).  
As one can see from Table 5, the regression regarding effective marginal tax rates 
performs poorly. In line with the results of Devereux et al. (2008) or Overesch and Rincke 
(2011), the R2 is significantly lower and none of the weighting schemes suggests the existence 
of tax interactions. In addition, the results reveal that the real market potential almost never 
significantly influences the effective tax rate level.27 This is exactly what we expected given 
that the effective marginal tax rate is not a relevant measure when it comes to evaluating the 
impact of fiscal policy on firms’ location choices.28 
                                                                                                                                                        
weighting scheme become significant. 
26
 Devereux et al. (2008) find similar results for their sample of 21 OECD countries. While at first sight this 
evidence seems to conflict, it might be explained by the possibility of dual competition on tax rates and public 
inputs. Right-wing parties might be willing to raise corporate taxes if fiscal revenues are used to finance public 
inputs that are attractive for firms, whereas left-wing parties would be prone to set a higher corporate tax in order 
to finance social expenditures. 
27
 The only exception appears in column [3]. When we use relative population weights to build the strategic tax 
variable, the real market potential variable is marginally significant. 
28
 Another explanation we cannot exclude is that the construction of effective marginal tax rates relies on some 
assumptions that might not reflect the influence of the economic environment on investment decisions. 
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 As a robustness check we also test interactions in the setting of statutory tax rates. The 
results in Table 6 reveal the existence of significant tax interactions for both relative 
population and trade integration weighting schemes. Thus, bilateral trade integration seems to 
contribute to the decline in statutory tax rates by giving rise to strategic behaviour on the part 
of governments. We might object that this provides empirical evidence for competition to 
attract mobile profits, rather than mobile firms. Indeed, what matters the most for tax 
optimization strategies is the relative level of statutory tax rates, rather than the definition of 
the tax base. Observe, however, that the coefficient of the real market potential is even more 
significant and on average more than two times higher than its impact on the effective average 
tax rate. Given that the location of profits should depend on profit-shifting incentives rather 
than on the market potential, we can surmise that competition over the statutory tax rate is not 
exclusively aimed at attracting profits but also at attracting profitable firms. In fact, our results 
might suggest that governments prefer to reduce their statutory tax rate rather than to narrow 
their tax base (through effective average tax rates) in order to improve their attractiveness. 
 
 c) Is it all about tax competition for mobile firms? 
 
So far we have considered the possibility that governments compete for firms, for 
marginal investment decisions, or for mobile profits. Besides those motives, we can think of 
other reasons for the existence of international interdependencies in the setting of corporate 
taxes. Tax interactions could also result from yardstick competition (Besley and Case, 1995; 
Bordignon et al., 2003): in such a case, strategic interactions are induced by the behaviour of 
citizens, not by the mobility of capital. The intuition is that policy-makers in one country 
could adjust their policy in response to neighbouring countries because citizens compare 
domestic and foreign policies to make their voting decisions. The relevance of this hypothesis 
can be tested by introducing a dummy for the years of election, or/and by observing the 
interaction of this dummy with the strategic tax variable. Doing so, Cassette and Paty (2008) 
and Redoano (2014) do not find support for the existence of yardstick competition. This is not 
surprising, as the level of corporate tax may not be the policy decision that citizens care about 
the most.  
Becker and Davies (2015) suggest an alternative explanation for the empirical 
evidence of tax interactions. They build a model in which countries have incomplete 
information regarding the true state of nature. This means that, regarding the corporate tax 
policy for example, governments do not observe firms’ responsiveness to changes in 
corporate taxation (especially for firms located in foreign countries). Therefore, governments 
refine their beliefs by observing the policies set elsewhere. As a consequence, they set 
policies as if they react to each other. Importantly, those ‘fake’ tax interactions will depend on 
the determinants of the network formation. Geographical proximity, capital mobility, trade 
integration or the relative population size of the other countries are all potential criteria that 
one country might retain when deciding upon the set of countries from which it will learn. 
Therefore, we can hardly preclude the possibility that such a mechanism of social learning 
might also drive the results. However, this alternative source of tax interdependencies is again 
more relevant for policies that are easy to observe and compare across countries. This is not 
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the case for the effective average tax rate as this depends on a combination of statutory tax 
rates and the definition of the corporate tax base. By considering the effective average tax rate 
as a dependent variable, we therefore alleviate the possibility that yardstick competition or 
social learning could drive our results.  
Moreover, recall that tax competition for firms occurs if and only if firms are mobile 
and responsive to tax differentials. Following Devereux et al. (2008), we further investigate 
the importance of capital mobility for tax interactions by allowing the coefficient α to vary 
with the degree of capital mobility of countries. We approximate capital mobility by the Index 
of Capital Mobility Constraints (ICMC) from the Economic Freedom of the World database. 
This index combines information about foreign investment restrictions (taken from the Global 
Competitiveness Report) and international capital controls (taken from the IMF) into a 10-
point scale, where increasing numbers indicate higher capital mobility. We cannot allow the 
coefficient of tax interaction to vary by country, due to lack of degrees of freedom. Therefore 
we simply divide observations between two groups of countries: those where the average 
ICMC index is above, respectively below, the median level of the ICMC (6.22). This 
generates a dummy variable p that takes the value 0 if country i belongs to the group of 
relatively ‘closed’ economies (ICMC < 6,22) and 1 if it belongs to the group of relatively 
‘open’ economies (ICMC ≥ 6,22).29 This allows us to construct the average tax rate of the 
other ‘open’ countries (N̅,M ) and ‘closed’ countries (N̅,M ) as follows: 
 N̅,M  ∑ m$Mp$$M$n  and N̅,M  ∑ m$M#1  p$%$M$n   
Next, we estimate this extended regression: 
N,M  ,MN  bpN̅,M  bpN̅,M  b1  p̅N,M  
           b1  p̅N,M  cdeM  fgM    M  kM 
If governments compete on taxes to attract firms, we would expect tax interactions to be 
significant only between open countries (α 	 0). 
We report results for the unbalanced sample in Table 7. Our findings indeed reveal 
significant tax interactions between open economies in the case of the relative population 
weights (column [3]) and trade integration weights (column [4]). In addition, countries that 
are relatively closed to flows of capital interact significantly with those that are open to capital 
flows when taxes are weighted by the relative population.30 Given the way we build the 
dummy variable p, this result might rather suggest that the ‘less open’ economies interact in 
taxes only with respect to those countries that are ‘more open’ to capital flows because the tax 
base elasticity is higher with respect to those countries. Overall, we believe these results 
                                                 
29
 While the index of capital mobility constraint varies over time, the set of countries belonging to the ‘open 
economies’ and ‘closed economies’ groups is fairly stable. 
30
 We also estimated this extended regression for the balanced sample and the Europe sample (results available 
from the author upon request). Whatever the weighting scheme, the coefficients b and b are never significant. 
In other words, whatever the degree of capital mobility in one country, this country does not interact in the 
setting of corporate taxes with respect to countries where restrictions to capital mobility are strong. In contrast, 
coefficients b and b remain significantly positive when the relative population weight is employed for the 
balanced sample. Regarding the subsample of European countries, tax interactions are positive and significant 
exclusively between open economies (b 	 0) when weights are defined by the inverse of distance. 
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provide further evidence that tax competition for firms is at least one mechanism which 
contributes to explaining the interdependencies in corporate taxes at the international level. 
d) Further robustness checks 
     Finally, we undertook two additional robustness checks regarding the way we account for 
the influence of the time dimension on corporate taxes.31 To account for non-observable 
characteristics varying over time, we run regressions with a dummy for each decade in 
addition to the time trend. Results in Table 2 and Table 7 are robust to such an extension. In 
addition, we considered the possibility that governments react to the lagged – rather than 
contemporary – average tax rate of other countries (for a discussion about theories of tax 
competition in a dynamic framework, see Keen and Konrad, 2013). Most of the coefficients 
of tax interactions are not significant anymore, thus providing little suggestion that tax 
decisions could be made sequentially over a time period longer than one year. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the empirical relevance of the tax competition literature based on 
the new economic geography literature, by estimating reaction functions over different 
measures of corporate taxation on a panel of 26 OECD countries between 1982 and 2006.  
We provide striking support for the two main predictions inferred from a simple 
economic geography framework. First, national governments seem to adjust their effective 
average tax rate towards the level chosen in countries with higher populations, because the tax 
base elasticity is higher with respect to these countries. Moreover, given the tax policy in the 
other countries, governments tend to set higher corporate tax rate when their own country 
enjoys a high real market potential. This suggests that agglomeration economies create rents 
that the government can tax away without inducing a large capital outflow. Importantly, those 
results are very robust. 
Unlike most of the existing empirical studies that examine the importance of capital 
mobility for tax competition, we also provide empirical evidence regarding the role played by 
trade liberalization. Specifically, we investigate the impact of trade liberalization on both the 
slope and the constant of the tax reaction function. Everything else being equal, trade 
integration exerts a positive influence on corporate taxes by improving the real market 
potential. The empirical evidence regarding its influence on the slope of the reaction function 
is clear-cut. Bilateral trade liberalization gives rise to significant strategic interactions in the 
setting of statutory tax rates, whereas the empirical evidence regarding its impact on effective 
average tax rates is limited to the subsample of European countries. In those cases, the decline 
in trade costs thus exerts an ambiguous impact on corporate taxes. It contributes to the 
downward adjustment in corporate taxes by strengthening tax interactions, but it might also 
raise taxes by improving the market potential of countries. This finding provides some 
support for the prediction, brought out in the literature on tax competition based on the 
economic geography framework, of a non-monotonous relationship between corporate taxes 
and trade costs. 
                                                 
31
 To save space we do not report those results, but they are available from the author upon request. 
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To conclude, we aimed at providing some evidence for the existence of competition for 
firms, rather than claiming that this is the only explanation at work. Of course we may 
consider the possibility that other theories, such as tax competition for profits, yardstick 
competition or social learning could partially drive our results. Unlike these alternative 
theories, which provide predictions regarding the slope of the reaction function, the theory of 
tax competition for firms in a lumpy world provides determinants for both the slope and the 
constant of corporate tax rates. Importantly, our empirical results suggests that this theory 
contributes to explaining both the downward trend in the evolution of corporate taxes and the 
persistence of higher taxes in countries that enjoy a high market potential.32  
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A. Appendix 
A.1.   Bilateral trade liberalization index 
In order to approximate the level of bilateral trade integration, we build on the multi-country 
version of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model, where firms operate in a market with 
monopolistic competition and barriers to trade (Head and Mayer, 2004a). Under the 
hypotheses of no trade costs at the subnational scale and symmetric trade costs at the 
international scale, this model yields the following index of trade phi-ness: 
etu$  #$$% #$$%r  
with $ the total value of exports from country i  to country j , and  the total value of trade 
flows inside country i . 
We use the Trade and Production database of the CEPII, which collects bilateral trade 
flows at the ISIC rev2 3-digit industry level (26 industrial sectors) from 1980 to 2006. By 
summing trade flows across sectors, we obtain the relative index of bilateral trade integration 
etu$M. 
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A.2.   Data sources and summary statistics 
 
Definitions and data sources  
cM, dcM and =M: effective average tax rate, effective marginal tax rate and 
statutory tax rate (Loretz, 2008).   
u{zM : top marginal income tax rate (World Tax Database and OECD tax database).  
etu$M : trade phi-ness index (our calculations, sources: Trade and Production database).  
xyuM : sum of inward and outward FDI flows over GDP (in current $) (World Development 
Indicators).  
ezp{=M: general government final consumption expenditures in percentage of GDP (World 
Development Indicators).  
cdeM : real market potential (U 10) (CEPII market potential database, and own 
calculations).  
}c~M: proportion of population living in urban areas (World Development Indicators).  
pyM: proportion of population more than 65 years old (World Development Indicators).  
|p}M: proportion of population less than 14 years old (World Development Indicators).  
yecM : GDP growth from year t-1 to year t (World Development Indicators). 
cutM: Coded 1 if executive right-wing, 0 if center or left-wing (Database of Political 
Institutions 2012) 
dM: Fraction of seats held by government in legislature (Database of Political 
Institutions 2012) 
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Table 1: Summary statistics (baseline sample) 
 
Variable observations mean std. Dev. min max 
=M 631 0.366 0.114 0.1 0.65 dcM 607 0.226 0.116 -0.844 0.4867 cM 607 0.275 0.086 0.05 0.488 cdeM 652 0.010 0.016 0.00008 0.105 u{zM 640 0.429 0.145 0.07 0.844 |p}M 702 20.187 4.252 13.574 39.822 pyM 702 13.464 2.833 4.377 21.021 }c~M 702 72.4 10.627 43.287 93.2718 ezp{=M 680 19.211 4.158 7.516 29.594 yecM 678 2.724 2.577 -14.574 11.495 cutM 679 0.573 0.130 0.255 1 dM 692 0.419 0.494 0 1 
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A.3.   Results 
Table 2: Baseline regression on effective average tax rates (unbalanced sample) 
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Table 3: Baseline regression on effective average tax rates (balanced sample) 
 
 
 
 Model without tax 
interactions 
Model with tax interactions 
  [1] [2] [3]               
Relative 
population 
matrix 
[4]             
Trade 
phiness 
matrix 
[5]            
Distance 
matrix 
[6]                 
FDI matrix 
Lagged tax of country i  0.777*** 0.804*** 0.773*** 0.778*** 0.779***     
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.042)  
Average tax of other 
countries 
  0.794** 0.001 0.053 0.277*    
  (0.343) (0.240) (0.277) (0.157)   
Real market potential 0.480* 0.227*** 0.247*** 0.232*** 0.231*** 0.276***     
(0.285) (0.060) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.081)  
Top income tax rate 0.180*** 0.069*** 0.045** 0.067** 0.066** 0.052**     
(0.061) (0.024) (0.019) (0.033) (0.030) (0.025)   
Proportion old -0.004 -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**    
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   
Proportion young -0.016*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***    
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Proportion urban -0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001     
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Public consumption/GDP -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003**    
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   
GDR growth -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Right 0.030 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.010     
(0.030) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)    
Right*Majority -0.026 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.004     
(0.050) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)    
Left*Majority 0.013 0.021** 0.017* 0.021** 0.020** 0.022**     
(0.022) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)   
EU -0.053*** 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007     
(0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
(0.006) (0.006)    
Trend -0.005*** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000    
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hansen test (p-val)  0.366 0.969 0.894 0.574 0.191 
K-P-under (p-val)  0.000 0.002 0.022 0.024 0.000 
Observations 450 414 414 399 414 414 
R-squared 0.59 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 
Serial correl. Test 
Top. Inc. endogeneity test 
 
0.241  
0.137 
0.313 
0.098 
0.667 
0.154 
0.480 
0.112 
0.506 
0.389 
0.146 
Estimations on a balanced sample of 18 countries over the period 1982-2006. Dependent variable, Effective 
average tax rates. Parentheses contain standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.  
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Table 4: Baseline regression on effective average tax rates (Europe sample)  
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Table 5: Baseline regression on effective marginal tax rates (unbalanced sample) 
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Table 6: Baseline regression on statutory tax rates (unbalanced sample) 
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Table 7: Extended regression on effective average tax rates (unbalanced sample) 
 
 
 
  [3]               
Relative 
population 
matrix 
[4]             
Trade 
phiness 
matrix 
[5]            
Distance matrix 
[6]                 
FDI 
matrix 
Lagged tax of country i 0.759*** 0.741*** 0.767*** 0.728*** 
(0.036) (0.048) (0.044) (0.038) 
 
0.457* 0.240* 0.147 -0.015 
(0.276) (0.125) (0.151) (0.106) 
 
0.240 -0.371 0.011 0.086 
       (0.216) 
 
(0.284) (0.148) (0.173) 
 
0.723* -0.345 -0.188 0.147 
(0.423) (0.237) (0.253) (0.176) 
 
0.123 0.103 0.226 0.077 
(0.307) (0.295) (0.169) (0.182) 
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies yes yes yes yes 
Hansen test (p-val) 0.452 0.142 0.427 0.516 
K-P-under (p-val) 0.000 0.100 0.056 0.000 
Observations 529 514 529 529 
R-squared 0.67 0.60 0.64 0.65 
Estimations on an unbalanced sample of 26 countries over the period 1982-2006. 
Dependent variable, Effective average tax rates. Parentheses contain standard errors 
robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% 
and *** 1%. 
 
